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REs JuDICATA---STATE CoukT's D1sM1ssAL AS A BAR TO A NEw SuIT oN
THE SAME CAUSE IN A FEDERAL COURT EXERCISING DIVERSITY JURISDIC-

TION-A citizen of Virginia brought suit in a North Carolina court against a
citizen of North Carolina for a deficiency judgment on a note executed in Virginia ·for the purchase of land in Virginia. Defendant's demurrer to the complaint on the ground that a North Carolina statute 1 precluded recovery was
overruled; defendant appealed. In spite of plaintiff's contention that the statute
was an invalid abridgment of the full faith and credit clause of Article IV of
the Constitution of the United States, the North Carolina Supreme Court held
that the statute effectively barred the action from the state courts and dismissed
the case. 2 Plaintiff then brought suit in the United States District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina on the same cause of action invoking diversity jurisdiction; defendant pleaded the state judgment in bar. The district
court gave judgment for plaintiff on the ground that the state could not limit
federal jurisdiction by procedural legislation; 8 the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit affirmed.4 On certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United
States, held, reversed. The North Carolina Supreme Cohrt's adjudication
barred the action in the federal court; plaintiff could contest the correctness of
the decision only by•appeal from the state court. Angel v. Bullington, (U.S.
1947) 67 S. Ct. 657.
The majority opinion expressed by Justice Frankfurter, indicates that the
constitutional question involved in the state court's decision could not be raised
again. The court does not regard the jurisdiction of the federal court as.different,
in this instance, from that of the state court; 5 thus the jurisdictional issues are
identical, and the traditional definition of res judicata 6 bars the second suit.

1 "In all sales of real property by mortgagees and/or trustees under powers of sale
contained in any mortgage or deed of trust executed after February 6, 1933, ••• the
mortgagee or trustee or holder of the notes secured by such mortgage or deed of trust
shall not be entitled to a deficiency judgment on account of such mortgage, deed of
trust or obligation secured by the same••••" N.C. Gen. Stat. (1943) § 45-36, N.C.
Pub. Laws (1933) c. 36.
2 Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18, 16 S.E. (2d) 4n (1941).
8 Bullington v. Angel, (D.C. N.C. 1944) 56 F. Supp. 372.
4 Angel v. Bullington, (C.C.A. 4th, 1945) 150 F. (2d) 679, noted, 24 N.C.
L. REv. 267 (1946) •.
5 "For purposes of diversity jurisdiction a federal court is 'in effect, only another
court of the State.'" Principal case at 659. See also, Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326
U.S. 99 at 108, 65 S. Ct. 1464 (1945); Madisonville Traction Co. v. Saint Bernard
Mining Co., 196 U.S. 239 at 253, 25 S. Ct. 251' (1905). ·
6 "An adjudication bars future litigation between the same parties not only as to
all •issues actually raised and decided but also as to those which could have been raised."
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The dissent of Justice Reed points out that since the state court was without
jurisdiction, its decision was not on the merits and not res judicata. 7 But this
objection is not applicable if the premise is granted that a federal court exercising
diversity jurisdiction is "in effect" a state court 8 in which judgment of dismissal
would be conclusive. As pointed out in the dissent of Justice Rutledge, the
court does not expressly decide whether the statute could have withheld federal
jurisdiction had the suit been commenced in the federal court; however, the
Court designates as "obsolete" a case in which it was held that a New York
statute preventing· foreign corporations from bringing suit in state courts unless
they had complied with local requirements, could not apply to federal courts in
diversity cases.9 The opinion of the North Carolina court that the statute is a
part of the state's "adjective" 10 law does not help. The Supreme Court analyses
the problem as one not of choice of law, in which the state court's view of a doctrine as "substantive" or "procedural" might be relevant, but of jurisdiction
under the Erie 11 case, a situation where such labels are at best misleading. In
effect, the principal case adds another link in the chain binding federal to state
courts.12 Whether the action could have been maintained in the federal court
originally, if it had arisen before a state court decision had been rendered on the
constitutional issue, is an interesting question. It is clear, in any case, that the
Principal case at 659. See also Grubb v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 281
U.S. 470 at 479, 50 S. Ct. 374 (1930), and cases there cited. See, generally, von
Moschzisker, "Res Judicata," 38 YALE L. J. 299 (1929); Scott, "'Collateral Estoppel
by Judgment," 56 HARV. L. REV. I (1942).
·
1 While the supreme court has held that a federal court's adjudication on a subject over which it has no jurisdiction is res judicata in a second action in a federal
court, Chicot County Drainage District v. Baxter State Bank, 308 U.S. 371, 60 S. Ct.
317 (1939); Jackson v. Irving Trust Co., 311 U.S. 494, 61 S. Ct. 326 (1941); this
doctrine may not be applied in all instances to decisions of state courts lacking jurisdiction over the subject matter, Kloeb v. Armour & Co., 311 U.S. 199, 61 S. Ct. 213
(1940); United States v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 60
S. Ct. 653 (1940); Kalb v. Feuerstein, 308 U.S. 433, 60 S. Ct. 343 (1940). For a
general discussion of this problem see, Boskey and Braucher, "Jurisdiction and Collateral Attack: October Ter!ll, 1939," 40 CoL, L. REv. 1006 (1940).
8
Supra, note 5.
9 David Lupton's Sons Co. v. Auto. Club of America, 225 U.S. 489, 32 S. Ct.
711 (1912).
10 "The statute operates upon the adjective law of the state, which pertains to the
practice and procedure, or legal machinery by which the substantive law is made effective and not upon the substantive law itself." Bullington v. Angel, 220 N.C. 18 at
20, 16 S.E. (2d) 411 (1941).
11 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
12 Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304, U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938); Guaranty Trust
Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 65 S. Ct. 1464 (1945) (statutes of limitation) noted in
circuit court in 44 CoL. L. REv. 915 (1944); Cities Service Oil Co. v. Dunlap, 308
U.S. 208, 60 S. Ct. 201 (1939) (burden of proof); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Co., 313
U.S. 487, 61 S. Ct. 1020 (1941), and Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498, 61 S. Ct.
1023 ( 1941) (conflicts rules). On this aspect of the principal case see annotation of
the North Carolina decision in 136 A.L.R. 1057 (1942); it is noted at length in 24
N.C.L. REv. 267 (1946).
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constitutional power of the state to exclude actions of this kind should be tested
by appeal from the state court if that forum is the one originally selected.
Richard J. Archer

